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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporation B is currently on the verge of going under.  Corporation A 
is considering acquiring Corporation B, but before Corporation A agrees, it 
wants to know if Corporation B has any ongoing legal issues.  Corporation B 
is currently engaged in litigation unrelated to the acquisition.  Can 
Corporation B share litigation-related material with Corporation A?  The 
outcome depends largely on whether the jurisdiction recognizes the common 
interest doctrine.  In Kansas, such a communication would put Corporation 
B in a precarious situation.  If Corporation B shares litigation-related 
materials with Corporation A, it likely waives its attorney-client privilege, 
and thus the litigation materials would become discoverable by the opposing 
party.  However, if Corporation B does not share this information with 
Corporation A, it will likely lose the deal.  The common interest doctrine’s 
jurisdictional inconsistency makes this hypothetical a realistic possibility. 
Generally, a client waives attorney-client privilege if they communicate 
previously privileged information to a third party.1  However, approximately 
ninety percent of jurisdictions recognize an exception to this rule known as 
the common interest doctrine.2  The common interest doctrine allows parties 
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 1.   E.g., People v. Harris, 442 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (N.Y. 1982). 
 2.   Over forty states have found that attorney-client privilege is not waived when confidential 
communications are shared among co-parties retaining separate counsel.  Amended Brief & Cross-
Appeal of Appellee-Cross Appellant British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd., Smith v. Philip 
Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (No. 12-108491-A), 2013 WL 4038830, at *20–23 
[hereinafter Amended Brief & Cross-Appeal] (citing B.E. Meyers & Co. v. United States, 41 Fed. 
Cl. 729, 732 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (finding that the common interest doctrine is “well recognized in all 
circuits that have considered it”)); ALA. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); ALASKA R. EVID. 503(b)(3); Ariz. 
Indep. Redistricting Comm’n v. Fields, 75 P.3d 1088, 1099–100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)); ARK. R. 
EVID. 502(b)(3); CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West 2009) (comment to 1965 amendment); Gordon v. 
Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106, 1124 (Colo. 2000); McPhee Elec. Ltd., LLC v. Konover Constr. Corp., No. 
CV075009694, 2009 WL 455866, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2009); DEL. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); 
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sharing a common interest in a legal matter to share privileged information 
without waiving attorney-client privilege.3  Kansas is one of the last 
jurisdictions that still does not recognize the common interest doctrine in 
some form,4 every federal circuit has recognized the doctrine, as well as an 
overwhelming majority of state jurisdictions.5 
The common interest doctrine generally requires (1) that attorney-client 
privilege serves as the basis of the claim, (2) the parties share a common 
interest, (3) the communication is made in furtherance of this interest, and 
                                                          
Volpe v. Conroy, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., 720 So. 2d 537, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Spence v. 
Hamm, 487 S.E.2d 9, 11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (finding the common interest, referred to as the joint 
representation exception, did not apply); HAW. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); IDAHO R. EVID. 502(b)(3); Waste 
Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 328–29 (Ill. 1991); Corll v. Edward D. 
Jones & Co., 646 N.E.2d 721, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Brandon v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 681 
N.W.2d 633, 639–40 (Iowa 2004) (applying a “joint-client” privilege); KY. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); LA. 
CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506(B)(3) (2006); ME. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); Gallagher v. Office of the Attorney 
Gen., 787 A.2d 777, 784–85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001); Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Noonan Transp., 
No. 97-0325, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 548, *18–25 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2000); D’Alessandro 
Contracting Grp., LLC v. Wright, 862 N.W.2d 466, 473–75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014); Schmitt v. 
Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 416–17 (Minn. 1942), overruled by Leer v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. 
Ry. Co., 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); Lipton Realty, Inc. v. St. Louis 
Hous. Auth., 705 S.W.2d 565, 570–71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct & Insurer 
Imposed Billing Rules & Procedures, 2000 MT 110, ¶¶ 56–73, 299 Mont. 321, 2 P.3d 806; NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-503(2)(c) (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.095(3) (West 2004); 
N.H. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); LaPorta v. Gloucester Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 774 A.2d 545, 549–
50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); N.M. R. EVID. 11-503(B)(3); Parisi v. Leppard, 660 N.Y.S.2d 
307, 309–11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bourlon, 617 S.E.2d 40, 46–47 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 625 S.E.2d 779 (N.C. 2006); N.D. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(B)(3) (West 2009 & Supp. 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.225(2)(c) (West 
Supp. 2014); Young v. Presbyterian Homes Inc., 50 Pa. D. & C.4th 190, 195–201 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
2001) (providing table of authorities addressing common interest doctrine); Tobaccoville USA, Inc. 
v. McMaster, 692 S.E.2d 526, 531 (S.C. 2010) (limiting the doctrine to narrow factual situation); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(b)(3) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); State v. von Bulow, 
475 A.2d 995, 1008 (R.I. 1984); Vance v. State, 230 S.W.2d 987, 990–91 (Tenn. 1950) (citing 
Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 836–42 (Va. 1871)); TEX. R. EVID. 
503(b)(1)(C); UTAH R. EVID. 504(b)(2)(A)–(B); VT. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); Hicks v. Commonwealth, 
439 S.E.2d 414, 416–17 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Chahoon, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 836–42); State v. 
Emmanuel, 259 P.2d 845, 854–55 (Wash. 1953) (citing Hartness v. Brown, 59 P. 491, 494–95 
(Wash. 1899)); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03(2) (West Supp. 2013)); see also Hanover Ins. v. Rapo & 
Jepson Ins. Servs., Inc., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1112 (Mass. 2007). 
 3.   Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 35 (N.Y. 2016) 
(quoting Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE, Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 
364 (3d Cir. 2007)).  The common interest doctrine has been referred to by various terms such as the 
“common interest arrangement,” “common legal interest doctrine,” “joint litigant privilege,” “pooled 
information privilege,” “allied lawyer doctrine” and “allied litigant privilege.” Id. at 35 n.1.  
However, the name is less important than what determines the bounds of the doctrine.  Id. (quoting 
N. River Ins. Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 90 Civ. 2518, 1995 WL 5792, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 
1995)).  For the purpose of this Comment, the term “common interest doctrine” is used. 
 4.   At this time, the only jurisdictions not to recognize even a limited version of the common 
interest doctrine are Kansas, Ohio, West Virginia and Wyoming.  
 5.   See Amended Brief & Cross-Appeal, supra note 2, at *22. 
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(4) the parties may not have otherwise waived the privilege.6  The 
application of the common interest doctrine varies greatly and depends on 
both the circumstances and the jurisdiction.7  The doctrine’s jurisdictional 
inconsistency makes it difficult, if not impossible, for attorneys to accurately 
predict what actions will waive attorney-client privilege and subject 
sensitive materials to discovery in a subsequent litigation.8  Parties seeking 
to reap the benefits of the common interest doctrine need to clear two 
general hurdles: first, the jurisdiction must recognize the doctrine; and 
second, the parties must have a sufficient “common interest” as defined by 
that state.9 
Courts particularly struggle to define when parties share a “common 
interest.”  The most common approaches can be grouped into three stances: 
(1) courts do not recognize the common interest doctrine at all; (2) they 
recognize the common interest doctrine, but pending or anticipated litigation 
is required; or, most broadly, (3) they recognize the common interest 
doctrine as long as the parties share a common legal interest.10  The 
requirement, or lack thereof, of pending or anticipated litigation usually 
dictates whether the common interest doctrine can be applied in a 
transactional setting.11 
Courts requiring pending or anticipated litigation reason that parties 
cooperating outside of litigation are less likely to have a common legal 
interest and are more likely serving their own commercial interests.12  In 
contrast, a number of courts have extended the common interest doctrine to 
situations outside of litigation.13  There are a number of legal situations in 
which parties cooperate outside of the litigation context: “applying for 
patents;” “conducting due diligence,” in mergers, acquisitions, or other 
commercial transactions; “ensuring that mutually beneficial advertising is 
not misleading;” and ensuring compliance with the law in order to avoid 
“liability [or litigation] in the first place.”14  Of these situations, the common 
                                                          
 6.   See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76, cmts. a–g (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
 7.   See discussion infra Section II.E.  
 8.   See discussion infra Sections II.B & D.2. 
 9.   See discussion infra Section II.E. 
 10.   See discussion infra Section II.E.  
 11.   See discussion infra Section II.D.2.  
 12.   See, e.g., Oak Indus. v Zenith Indus., No. 86 C 4302, 1988 WL 79614, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 
27, 1988); Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 36–40 (N.Y. 
2016). 
 13.   See infra Section II.D.2.  
 14.   Jared S. Sunshine, Seeking Common Sense for the Common Law of Common Interest in the 
D.C. Circuit, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 833, 844 (2016).  
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interest doctrine has been most widely discussed in patent law and 
substantial business transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions.15  Both 
of these situations involve parties that are arguably adverse, as they 
generally sit on opposite sides of a negotiating table, but still have a 
common interest in the patent, or successful completion of the deal.16  
Courts applying the common interest doctrine to such situations reason that 
they should not create a “procedural doctrine that restricts communication[s] 
between buyers and sellers, [and] erects barriers to business deals.”17 
This Comment argues that Kansas should recognize the common 
interest doctrine in a form that protects parties both within and outside the 
scope of anticipated or pending litigation.  This form allows parties to 
predict whether information will be disclosed and furthers the rationale 
behind attorney-client privilege.  Moreover, failure to recognize the common 
interest doctrine has both economic and ethical consequences for both 
Kansas attorneys and the Kansas judicial system. 
Part II of this Comment provides the background of the common interest 
doctrine, including its roots in attorney-client privilege, its evolution from 
the joint defense doctrine, and an overview of the modern doctrine across 
jurisdictions, as well as Kansas.  Part III argues that Kansas should 
recognize the common interest doctrine “to encourage the free flow of 
information and to enhance effective legal advice.”18  Additionally, it argues 
that Kansas should recognize and define a fairly broad version of the 
common interest doctrine, in order to provide clarity and certainty to Kansas 
attorneys and best align itself with other persuasive jurisdictions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The common interest doctrine is rooted in the attorney-client privilege 
doctrine and developed as an extension to the joint defense doctrine.19  
Today, jurisdictions have recognized the common interest doctrine in a 
variety of forms, ranging from broadly-worded statutes to cases restricting 
the doctrine to narrow factual scenarios.20  Jurisdictions vary most on two 
                                                          
 15.   See, e.g., ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., 7 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 42:35, Westlaw 
(updated Mar. 2017) (collecting applications of the common interest doctrine in patent law); Anne 
King, Comment, The Common Interest Doctrine and Disclosures During Negotiations for 
Substantial Transactions, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411, 1427–31 (2007).  
 16.   King, supra note 15, at 1426–32.  
 17.   Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
 18.   Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common Interest Doctrine 
Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 65 (2005). 
 19.   See infra Sections II.C–D.  
 20.   E.g., DEL. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); Tobaccoville USA, Inc. v. McMaster, 692 S.E.2d 526, 531 
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issues: (1) defining a “common interest” and (2) whether litigation should be 
a requirement for parties to have a sufficiently common interest.21 
A. Attorney-Client Privilege 
The common interest doctrine is rooted in attorney-client privilege.  
Accordingly, the common interest doctrine has been characterized as both 
“an extension of the attorney-client privilege and . . . as an exception to the 
traditional waiver of the attorney-client privilege.”22  Attorney-client 
privilege applies to communications meeting the following elements: “(1) a 
communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) 
for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.”23  
The client, the attorney(s), and any of their agents who help facilitate the 
attorney-client communications or legal representation are considered 
“privileged persons.”24  Only the client can waive the privilege.25  Because 
legal advice is often sought for the sole purpose of avoiding litigation or 
ensuring compliance with the law, the contemplation of litigation is not a 
prerequisite for protection under attorney-client privilege.26 
Attorney-client privilege is considered the oldest common-law privilege 
and is an exception to the maxim that the public has the right to “every 
man’s evidence.”27  It serves to encourage frank communication between 
attorneys and clients and in doing so, promotes the broader public interest 
“in the observance of law and administration of justice.”28  However, courts 
have reasoned that this also limits the truth-seeking process, so the privilege 
is generally construed narrowly.29  “[T]he mere fact that an attorney [is] 
involved . . . does not automatically” invoke the privilege; rather the 
“communication . . . must relate to legal advice or strategy.”30  These same 
                                                          
(S.C. 2010). 
 21.   See discussion infra Section II.D. 
 22.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 54–55.  
 23.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 24.   Id. at § 70. 
 25.   See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 4 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 92 (John W. Strong ed., 1992)); Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 
(21 Gratt.) 822, 841 (Va. 1871). 
 26.   E.g., Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 1991).  
 27.   In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006) (first 
quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); then quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). 
 28.   Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  
 29.   See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709–10.  
 30.   In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2010) (first quoting Motley 
v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1550–51 (10th Cir. 1995); then quoting United States v. 
Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998)).  
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ideals extend to the common interest doctrine and as such, the justifications 
and critiques of attorney-client privilege carry over to the common interest 
doctrine.31 
Corporations, like individual clients, can claim attorney-client 
privilege.32  Attorney-client privilege allows corporations to structure their 
behavior in a way that complies with the law through advice from corporate 
counsel.33  In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated the 
rationale for corporations’ use of attorney-client privilege, reasoning that a 
narrow interpretation of the privilege “not only makes it difficult for 
corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with 
a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of 
corporate counsel to ensure their client’s compliance with the law.”34  The 
Court went on to distinguish individuals’ and corporations’ use of the law: 
“[C]orporations, unlike most individuals, ‘constantly go to lawyers to find 
out how to obey the law,’ particularly since compliance with the law in this 
area is hardly an instinctive matter.”35  The Upjohn decision reinforced the 
universally accepted idea that corporate communications deserve protection 
under attorney-client privilege, just as individuals are entitled to.36  
However, the applicability of this idea under the common interest doctrine is 
largely uncertain, as jurisdictions have inconsistently applied the doctrine to 
situations involving corporate attorney-client privilege.37 
Because the common interest doctrine is rooted in attorney-client 
privilege, it cannot apply unless the underlying communication would have 
been protected prior to its disclosure.38  Therefore, it is critical that the 
underlying communication is protected by attorney-client privilege and has 




                                                          
 31.   See Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 44–48 
(N.Y. 2016) (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 32.   Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389–90.  
 33.   Id. at 392. 
 34.   Id.; see also King, supra note 15, at 1421 (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 392).  
 35.   Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 392 (citations omitted) (quoting Bryson P. Burnham, The 
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 BUS. LAW. 901, 913 (1969)).  
 36.   Id. at 389–90. 
 37.   See discussion infra Section II.D.2.a.  
 38.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 55–56. 
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B. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
Generally, the disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication to a 
third party constitutes a waiver of attorney-client privilege.39  Similarly, 
communications made in the presence of third parties are not privileged.40  
These acts of disclosure signal that the communication was not intended to 
be kept confidential or secret.41  Waiver can be express, or implied through 
actions.42  Implied waiver is especially high risk because waiving attorney-
client privilege on one communication—for example, a patent opinion—will 
usually waive all communications related to that matter, such as emails, 
memoranda, and other communications related to the patent.43  Moreover, 
even a discussion of the privileged communications’ general subject matter 
may constitute an implied waiver.44  Other courts, concerned by the 
potentially grave consequences of implied waiver, only find an implied 
waiver if it jeopardizes fairness—such as when communications are partially 
disclosed and fairness requires disclosure of the entire communication “to 
provide a complete context.”45 
The common interest doctrine works as an exception to implied waiver 
for communications made to a third party sharing a common legal interest.46  
The purpose of the doctrine, similar to that of attorney-client privilege, is “to 
encourage the free flow of information and [] enhance the quality of legal 
advice.”47  By protecting parties with a common legal interest from waiving 
attorney-client privilege, the common interest doctrine allows attorneys and 
                                                          
 39.   Thomas M. Geisler, Jr., Proof of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, 32 AM. JUR. PROOF 
OF FACTS 3d 189, § 8 (Feb. 2017 update, Westlaw).   
 40.   E.g., Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 35 (N.Y. 
2016) (quoting People v. Harris, 442 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (1982)). 
 41.   Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 
361 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 
9:28 (2d ed. 1999)). 
 42.   King, supra note 15, at 1421.  
 43.   See Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977, 980–82 (D. Del. 1982). 
 44.   See Am. Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431–33 (D. Mass. 1972) 
(holding a lawyer’s disclosure of certain opinions during licensing negotiations did not waive 
privilege). 
 45.   King, supra note 15, at 1421–23; see also Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 
F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the 
Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1627–28 (1986)).  
 46.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 50, 55. 
 47.   Id. at 51; see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 
244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989)); 
Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440–41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
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their clients to make more precise predictions about the risk of waiver and 
how to avoid it.48 
C. The Joint Defense Doctrine 
The common interest doctrine evolved from the joint defense doctrine—
one of the first expansions on the scope of attorney-client privilege.49  The 
joint defense doctrine was the first exception to the general rule that 
attorney-client privilege is waived upon disclosure of privileged 
communications to a third party.50  It applies when a client shares privileged 
information with co-defendants for the purpose of forming a common 
defense strategy.51  The doctrine was originally only applied to criminal co-
defendants52 but has since been expanded to include civil co-defendants.53 
The 1871 case, Chahoon v. Commonwealth,54 is recognized as the first 
case to apply the joint defense doctrine.55  In Chahoon, Virginia’s highest 
court permitted criminal defense attorneys to coordinate their clients’ 
strategies and still retain attorney-client privilege for their 
communications.56  The court reasoned: 
[W]hether they [employed the same counsel, or employed different 
counsel as they did], the effect is the same, as to their right of 
communication to each and all of the counsel, and as to the privilege of 
such communication.  They had the same defence [sic] to make, the act 
of one . . . being the act of all, and the counsel of each was in effect the 
counsel of all, though, for purposes of convenience, he was employed 
and paid by his respective client.  They had a right, all the accused and 
their counsel, to consult together about the case and the defence, [sic] 
and it follows as a necessary consequence, that all the information, 
derived by any of the counsel from such consultation, is privileged, and 
the privilege belongs to each and all of the clients, and cannot be 
released without the consent of all of them.57 
                                                          
 48.   See Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 54. 
 49.   Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 35–37 (N.Y. 
2016).  
 50.   See id. 
 51.   Id. at 35 (quoting Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns 
Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
 52.   Id. at 35. 
 53.   See Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 415–417 (Minn. 1942), overruled by Leer v. Chi., 
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 308 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Minn. 1981). 
 54.   62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 830–43 (1871). 
 55.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 58. 
 56.   62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 830–43. 
 57.   Id. at 841–42. 
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Almost seventy-five years passed before the Minnesota Supreme Court 
expanded the joint defense privilege from strictly criminal co-defendants to 
include civil co-defendants in Schmitt v. Emery.58  Counsels for several co-
defendants exchanged a privileged document to prepare for objections to the 
document’s admission into evidence.59  The court held that this 
communication between counsel was privileged because the communication 
was made “in confidence, for the limited and restricted purpose to assist in 
asserting their common claims.”60  Schmitt marked the first steps toward 
today’s common interest doctrine. 
D. The Modern Common Interest Doctrine: Two Major Issues 
As courts began to expand the joint defense doctrine from strictly 
criminal co-defendants, the common interest doctrine emerged.61  
Nevertheless, jurisdictions did not apply it uniformly, creating confusion and 
inconsistency about how and when the doctrine applies.62  Generally, courts 
that recognize the doctrine require the invoking party to prove: (1) the 
underlying communication is protected by attorney-client privilege; (2) the 
parties had a common interest at the time the information was disclosed; (3) 
the information was shared in furtherance of that common interest; and (4) 
the parties have not waived the privilege.63  The privilege usually only 
applies where the clients are represented by separate counsel.64 
Several issues arise when courts apply the common interest doctrine: (1) 
“What is a common interest?” (2) Does the common interest doctrine require 
pending or anticipated litigation? (3) Does the doctrine apply to 
communications made in the absence of counsel? (4) Does the common 
interest doctrine apply “absent a written confidentiality agreement?” (5) 
Who can waive the common interest doctrine protection?65  While each 
question has its own implications on the doctrine, this Comment focuses on 
                                                          
 58.   2 N.W.2d at 416. 
 59.   Id. at 416–18. 
 60.   Id. at 417. 
 61.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 59–60. 
 62.   See Schaffzin, supra note 18 (discussing the common interest doctrine’s lack of uniform 
application, and a proposal of uniformity).  
 63.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 64.   Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE, Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp.), 493 F.3d 
345, 365–69 (3d Cir. 2007) (distinguishing from the “co-client privilege”); see also Sunshine, supra 
note 14, at 838–49, 848 tbl.1 (discussing differences between the common interest, joint defense, 
and co-client privileges). 
 65.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 69. 
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the two most discussed and inconsistently applied questions: What is a 
common interest, and does the doctrine apply in the absence of litigation? 
1. What Is a Common Interest? 
One issue courts face when applying the common interest doctrine is 
deciding what constitutes a “common interest.”66  Courts generally agree 
that the interest must be legal, as opposed to solely commercial.67  However, 
the agreement ends there.  Jurisdictions vary substantially, even on what 
constitutes a “legal” interest—some courts require an identical legal interest, 
while others only require a similar legal interest.68 
The definition of “legal interest” varies by jurisdiction.69  Courts 
requiring an identical legal interest vary on what constitutes “identical.”70  
Strict interpreters have only applied the common interest doctrine where 
parties are aligned on the same side of litigation, such as co-plaintiffs or co-
defendants.71  However, other courts have found parties’ interests “identical” 
when the parties have an “identical legal interest” regarding the subject 
matter of the privileged communication, such as the enforcement or validity 
of a patent.72  Courts employing a broader common interest doctrine may 
                                                          
 66.   See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Megan-Racine Assocs., Inc. (In re Megan-
Racine Assocs., Inc.), 189 B.R. 562, 573 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) (“A common legal interest exists 
where the parties asserting the privilege were co-parties to litigation or reasonably believed that they 
could be made a party to litigation.” (emphasis added)); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 
F. Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1975) (“A community of interest exists among different persons or 
separate corporations where they have an identical legal interest with respect to the subject matter of 
a communication between an attorney and a client concerning legal advice.” (emphasis added)). 
 67.   Duplan Corp., 397 F. Supp. at 1172.  The leading test for what constitutes a common 
interest was laid out in Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Inc.:  
A community of interest exists among different persons or separate corporations where 
they have an identical legal interest with respect to the subject matter of a communication 
between an attorney and a client concerning legal advice.  The third parties receiving 
copies of the communication and claiming a community of interest may be distinct legal 
entities from the client receiving the legal advice and may be a non-party to any 
anticipated or pending litigation.  The key consideration is that the nature of the interest 
be identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely commercial.  The fact that there may be 
an overlap of a commercial and a legal interest for a third party does not negate the effect 
of the legal interest in establishing a community of interest. 
Id. at 1172.  
 68.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 69–73. 
 69.   See infra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
 70.   See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 71.   See, e.g., United States ex rel. [Redacted] v. [Redacted], 209 F.R.D. 475, 479 (D. Utah 
2001) (quoting NL Indus. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 144 F.R.D. 225, 230–31 (D.N.J. 1992)) 
(“A community of interest exists where different persons or entities ‘have an identical legal interest 
with respect to the subject matter of a communication between an attorney and a client concerning 
legal advice.’”). 
 72.   E.g., Tenneco Packaging Specialty & Consumer Prods., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 
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only require a “substantially similar” interest.73  Some courts have even 
found a common interest where parties are engaged in adverse litigation.74  
Thus, while courts generally require the parties to share a “legal interest,” 
how that requirement is interpreted varies and is jurisdictionally dependent. 
There are some situations where the interest is purely commercial, and 
thus, the common interest doctrine does not apply.  In Cavallaro v. United 
States, two companies owned by the same family merged, and the merged 
entity sold for a substantial amount.75  The IRS investigated, suspecting the 
family overvalued the company to conceal a post-merger gift to their sons.76  
As part of the investigation, the IRS issued a summons to the defendant’s 
accounting firm who provided pre-merger tax advice.77  The family argued 
the communications were protected by attorney-client privilege because the 
accountant aided the law firm that provided legal advice concerning tax and 
merger issues.78  The First Circuit held the communications were not 
privileged, reasoning: “[T]he accountant does not share an interest in 
receiving legal advice from the lawyer and cannot logically be said to have 
an interest in common with the represented party or parties.”79 
How jurisdictions interpret or define “interest” can make or break 
parties’ invocation of the common interest doctrine.80  Therefore, parties 
must understand their jurisdiction’s definition of interest and ensure they 
meet the requisite definition before relying on the common interest 
doctrine.81 
2. Is Pending or Anticipated Litigation Required? 
Courts routinely disagree on whether the common interest doctrine 
applies absent pending or current litigation.82  Generally, the requirement of 
                                                          
No. 98 C 2679, 1999 WL 754748, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1999). 
 73.   E.g., In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (quoting 
Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE, Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 365 (3d 
Cir. 2007)).  
 74.   See, e.g., Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1987). 
 75.   284 F.3d 236, 239 (1st Cir. 2002).  
 76.   Id. 
 77.   Id. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Id. at 250. 
 80.   See discussion infra Section II.E. 
 81.   See discussion infra Section II.E. 
 82.   At least eleven states have restricted the common interest doctrine to communications 
made in furtherance of ongoing litigation through rule or statute. See ARK. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); HAW. 
R. EVID. 503(b)(3); KY. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); ME. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.H. 
R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.D. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(B)(3) (West 2009 & 
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pending or anticipated litigation aligns with how the court defines a common 
interest.  The more identical the court requires the interest to be, the more 
likely it is to require pending or anticipated litigation.  Courts requiring 
anticipated litigation reason that no common legal interest can exist without 
the threat of actual litigation.83  Conversely, courts that do not require 
pending or anticipated litigation believe that common legal interests can 
exist outside the scope of litigation.84  This lack of the common interest 
doctrine’s uniform application frustrates the purpose of attorney-client 
privilege by creating uncertainty about what communications will remain 
privileged.85 
a. Two Competing Viewpoints: An Illustration of the Doctrine’s 
Application to Communications Made in the Course of a Merger and 
Acquisition 
Jurisdictions generally take one of two competing viewpoints on 
whether the common interest doctrine applies to communications made 
absent pending or anticipated litigation, such as communications made 
during the due diligence period of mergers, acquisitions, or similarly 
substantial transactions.86  Whether the jurisdiction required pending or 
anticipated litigation was a determinative factor in both Ambac Assurance 
Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans87 and Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & 
Lomb,88 and led to substantially different results. 
                                                          
Supp. 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(b)(3) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); TEX. R. 
EVID. 503(b)(1)(C); VT. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).  Other jurisdictions have embraced the same limitation 
through judicial decision. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 711 (5th Cir. 2001); 
O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d 299, 304, 317 (N.J. 2014); Boyd v. Comdata Network, 
Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 214–15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Gallagher v. Office of Attorney Gen., 787 A.2d 
777, 784–85 (Md. 2001); Hicks v. Commonwealth, 439 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Visual 
Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440–41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  
 83.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 74. 
 84.   See Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. 
Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989)); United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 
816, 816 n.6 (7th Cir. 2007); Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE, Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns 
Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 364–66 (3d Cir. 2007); In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 
1390–1391 (Fed. Cir. 1996); United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 870 
N.E.2d 1105, 1110–12 (Mass. 2007); Santa Fe Pac. Gold Corp. v. United Nuclear Corp., 175 P.3d 
309, 316 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007). 
 85.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 53–54, 66.  
 86.   See Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 39–40 
(N.Y. 2016).  But see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 310–12 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987).  
 87.   57 N.E.3d 30 (N.Y. 2016). 
 88.   115 F.R.D. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
2017 LAST MAN STANDING 807 
In Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, New York’s 
highest court declined to apply the common interest doctrine to 
communications between parties to a merger and acquisition.89  The issue 
was whether defendant Bank of America was required to disclose a series of 
communications with defendant Countrywide Financial during the due 
diligence period of the companies’ 2008 merger.90  Plaintiff Ambac 
Assurance Corporation claimed Countrywide had fraudulently 
misrepresented the quality of the mortgage loans issued by Countrywide, 
and because of Countrywide’s merger with Bank of America, Bank of 
America was responsible for Countrywide’s liability.91 
During discovery, Bank of America withheld the communications, 
claiming that they were protected by the common interest doctrine because 
they pertained to legal issues connected with completing the merger.92  
Ambac argued that the voluntary sharing of confidential communications 
prior to the merger’s closing waived attorney-client privilege because it did 
not relate to pending or anticipated litigation.93  Reversing the appellate 
decision, a divided four-two court held that the common interest doctrine did 
not apply absent pending or anticipated litigation, reasoning: 
[A]ny benefits that may attend . . . an expansion of the doctrine are 
outweighed by the substantial loss of relevant evidence, as well as the 
potential for abuse.  The difficulty of defining “common legal interests” 
outside the context of litigation could result in the loss of evidence of a 
wide range of communications between parties who assert common 
legal interests but who really have only non-legal or exclusively 
business interests to protect.94 
The majority noted that New York’s formulation is “limited to situations 
where the benefit and the necessity of shared communications are at their 
highest, and the potential for misuse is minimal.”95  On the other hand, 
Judge Jenny Rivera, joined in the dissent by Judge Michael Garcia, reasoned 
that the “better rule is grounded not in the rote application of a litigation 
requirement, but in the legal dynamics of a modern corporate transactional 
practice.”96 
                                                          
 89.   57 N.E.3d at 32, 37. 
 90.   See id. at 32–35 (Countrywide became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bank of America 
post-merger). 
 91.   Id. at 32. 
 92.   Id. at 32–33. 
 93.   Id. at 33. 
 94.   Id. at 38. 
 95.   Id. at 37. 
 96.   Id. at 43 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
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In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., the Northern District 
of California reached the opposite conclusion in a patent law context.97  
Bausch & Lomb shared a privileged patent opinion letter with a potential 
buyer of one of its divisions.98  The letter concerned whether one of Hewlett-
Packard’s patents was valid, and whether Bausch & Lomb may have 
infringed on the patent.99  Hewlett-Packard claimed this communication 
waived attorney-client privilege.100  Bausch & Lomb contended, however, it 
disclosed the letter in anticipation of litigation because there was a real 
possibility that the third party would buy the division, and then that both 
Bausch & Lomb and the third party could face litigation with Hewlett-
Packard over the subject patent.101  The third party did not buy the division, 
therefore only Bausch & Lomb faced litigation over the patent.102  
Regardless, the court held privilege was not waived.103  Bausch & Lomb 
took substantial steps to ensure the potential buyer maintained the letter’s 
confidentiality: only two copies were made, the buyer was instructed no 
further copies were to be made, both copies were returned to Bausch & 
Lomb, and the letter was not disclosed to others.104 
While the court noted that, at the time the communication was made, 
joint litigation could be plausibly anticipated, the court relied more heavily 
on public policy concerns weighing against the finding of waiver: 
[E]xpansive definitions of waiver can pressure lawyers to claim 
privilege on documents that they would otherwise disclose and to 
litigate tenaciously the resulting discovery disputes all because the risks 
of inadvertent waiver are so great.  Thus expansive waiver doctrine 
increases the cost of litigation to the parties and increases the number 
of discovery disputes courts must resolve.  Moreover, the risk of waiver 
can create an advantage for those litigants who can afford the massive 
expenditures often required to protect against waiver.105 
Reasoning that the principal purpose of waiver should be to protect against 
parties who use privilege unfairly, the court distinguished between “partial” 
and “selective” disclosure.106  Partial disclosure occurs when a party uses 
                                                          
 97.   See 115 F.R.D. 308, 309–12 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
 98.   Id. at 308. 
 99.   Id. 
 100.   Id.  
 101.   Id. at 308–09. 
 102.   Id. at 310. 
 103.   Id. at 312. 
 104.   Id. at 309. 
 105.   Id. at 310 (citing Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1614 (1986)). 
 106.   Id. at 311 (citing Note, Development in the Law—Privileged Communication: VII. Implied 
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“advantageous portions of the privileged material,” while claiming privilege 
on portions that may be detrimental to their case.107  Selective disclosure 
occurs when a party, like Bausch & Lomb did here, “shares an entire 
document with a select[], limited audience.”108  The court reasoned that, 
“[t]hese kinds of disclosures generally leave the adverse party in no worse 
position than if no disclosure had taken place and, therefore, create no 
fairness issue.”109 
In holding that Bausch & Lomb had not waived attorney-client privilege 
when it shared the document, the court reasoned: 
Legal doctrine that impedes frank communication between buyers and 
sellers also sets the stage for more lawsuits, as buyers are more likely to 
be unpleasantly surprised by what they receive.  By refusing to find 
waiver in these settings courts create an environment in which 
businesses can share more freely information that is relevant to their 
transactions.  This policy lubricates business deals and encourages 
more openness in transactions of this nature.110 
The Hewlett-Packard court’s concerns about waiver’s impact on business 
transactions took the opposite position from the Ambac court. 
As illustrated by Hewlett-Packard and Ambac, whether the jurisdiction 
requires litigation leads to an entirely different result in factually similar 
situations.  As the court noted in Hewlett-Packard, a finding of wavier in 
these situations can have grave impacts not only on the parties involved, but 
in the larger economic scheme as well.111 
E. The National Spectrum 
An overwhelming majority of states have concluded that attorney-client 
privilege is not waived when privileged information is shared with co-
parties.112  In federal courts, the common interest doctrine is “well 
recognized in all circuits that have considered it.”113  As courts separately 
determined how to define the common interest doctrine’s elements, a variety 
                                                          
Waiver, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1629–65 (1985)). 
 107.   Id. 
 108.   Id. 
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Id. 
 111.   Id. 
 112.   See supra note 2.  
 113.   B.E. Meyers & Co. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 729, 732, 732 n.5 (1998); see generally 2 
JAMES W. MOORE & G. RICHARD POEHNER, MOORE’S FEDERAL RULES PAMPHLET § 501.7(6)(g) 
(2008). 
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of applications arose.114  Jurisdictions generally fall into three categories: (1) 
they recognize the common interest doctrine and require pending or 
anticipated litigation; (2) they recognize the common interest doctrine and 
do not require pending or anticipated litigation—these jurisdictions are most 
likely to apply the common interest doctrine in transactional situations; (3) 
they do not recognize the common interest doctrine at all.115  Of the 
jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine, some have codified their approach 
while others have left it to common law.116  This section provides an 
overview of the national spectrum as it sits today from broad application—
Massachusetts and Delaware—to narrow—New York and Texas. 
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes the 
broadest version of the common interest doctrine: 
If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or 
nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree 
to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of 
any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68–72 
that relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons.  Any 
such client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the 
client who made the communication.117 
The Restatement’s formulation is broad enough that it recognizes the 
privilege as used by co-defendants in both criminal and civil suits as well as 
in mergers and transactions between entities.118  However, Massachusetts is 
the only state that has adopted the Restatement version.119 
Delaware also employs a broad version of the common interest doctrine 
as codified in Delaware Rule of Evidence 502(b)(3).120  The Delaware 
statute is modeled after Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503, which, 
while not enacted, has provided a model for many jurisdictions choosing to 
                                                          
 114.   See infra notes 115–39 and accompanying text.  
 115.   See supra notes 1–4 and accompany text; Section II.D.2. 
 116.   See Amended Brief & Cross-Appeal, supra note 2, at *21–23 (citing cases).  
 117.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
2000) (emphasis added). 
 118.   See id. at § 76 cmt. c (“Exchanging communications may be predicated on an express 
agreement, but formality is not required.  It may pertain to litigation or to other matters.”). 
 119.   Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1110, 1112 (Mass. 
2007); Matthew D. LaBrie, The Common Interest Privilege, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 30, 2014), 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialevidence/articles/fall2014-0914-common-
interest-privilege.html.  
 120.   See DEL. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (“A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent 
any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating 
the rendition of professional legal services to the client . . . by the client or the client’s representative 
or the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer 
representing another in a matter of common interest . . . .”). 
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adopt a broader interpretation of the common interest doctrine.121  Actual or 
pending litigation is not required under the rule or statutory definition, 
however, in some situations parties may need to at least anticipate 
litigation.122  Delaware courts have extended the doctrine to communications 
in business transactions as long as the communications concern actual legal 
advice.123  “Actual legal advice” includes communications about legal 
advice for business matters, regulatory matters, and compliance, but not 
communications dealing primarily with business interests.124 
Each federal circuit recognizes some form of the common interest 
doctrine.125  The federal common interest doctrine generally leans towards a 
broader interpretation, and the majority of federal circuits and some state 
courts that have addressed the issue do not require pending or anticipated 
litigation.126  However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly 
required anticipated or pending litigation.127 
                                                          
 121.   See H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., at 19 (1st Sess. 1973); 1975 FRE Original Enactment 
Legislative History Page: Congressional Timeline, FED. EVID. REV., 
http://federalevidence.com/pdf/FRE_Amendments/1975_Orig_Enact/HR%205463%20%281973%2
9%20%28culminating%20in%201975%20enactment%29.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (providing a 
PDF copy of the 1973 amendment); see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-503(2)(c) (West 2009); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 49.095(3) (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.225(2)(c) (Supp. 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 905.03(2) (West Supp. 2013); ALASKA R. EVID. 503(b)(3); DEL. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.M. R. EVID. 
11-503(B)(3).  
 122.   See In re Lululemon Athletica Inc. 220 Litig., C.A. No. 9039–VCP, 2015 WL 1957196, at 
*9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (holding two parties “coordinat[ing] a statement” in responding to a 
Wall Street Journal inquiry shared a common legal interest, and anticipated litigation at the time they 
shared the privileged communications); Titan Inv. Fund II, LP v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., C.A. No. 
09C-10-259 WCC, 2011 WL 532011, at *4–5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2011) (holding two parties 
negotiating a potential commercial agreement at arm’s length did not have a common interest 
because their interests were adverse, they failed to assert a clear legal interest, and nothing suggested 
that the parties anticipated becoming parties to litigation at the time they shared legal advice). 
 123.   See Am. Legacy Found. v. Lorollard Tobacco Co., No. Civ. A. 19406, 2004 WL 2521289, 
at *3–5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004). 
 124.   See Glassman v. Crossfit, Inc., No. 7717-VCG, 2012 WL 4859125, *3–4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 
12, 2012) (citing Titan Inv. Fund, 2011 WL 532011, at *4). 
 125.   See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 979–81 (9th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 814–18 (7th Cir. 2007); Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE, 
Inc. (In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp.), 493 F.3d 345, 362–66 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Almeida, 341 F.3d 1318, 1323–27 (11th Cir. 2003); Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 249–
51 (1st Cir. 2002); In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 708–13 (5th Cir. 2001); In re IPCOM 
GMBH & Co., KG, 428 Fed. App’x. 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Frontier Roofing, Inc. v. Gorman-
Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 705 (10th Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 
F.3d 910, 922 (8th Cir.1997); In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389–91 (Fed. Cir. 
1996); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 248–49 (4th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243–45 (2d Cir. 1989); Cooey v. Strickland, 269 
F.R.D. 643, 652–53 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (citing Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 356 (6th Cir. 1998)).  
 126.   See, e.g., Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 850–
51, 851 n.1 (N.Y. 2016) (Rivera, J., dissenting); see also Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 
(2d Cir. 2015) (citing Schwimmer, 892 F.3d at 243); BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d at 816; In re 
Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 360–65; In re Regents, 101 F.3d at 1390–91; United States 
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On the other end of the spectrum, New York employs a strict 
interpretation of the common interest doctrine.128  Unlike Delaware and 
Massachusetts, New York has not codified its common interest doctrine.  
However, New York case law restricts its doctrine to civil and criminal 
matters, co-plaintiffs and co-defendants, and only in the context of pending 
or reasonably anticipated litigation.129  New York courts have uniformly 
rejected attempts at expanding the common interest doctrine to 
communications that do not involve pending or reasonably anticipated 
litigation.130  In Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
as previously discussed, New York’s highest court declined to apply the 
doctrine in the merger context, reasoning: “when businesses share a common 
interest in closing a complex transaction, their shared interest in the 
transaction’s completion is already an adequate incentive for exchanging 
information necessary to achieve that end.”131  The court further opined that 
any benefit reaped by the extension of the doctrine is outweighed by the loss 
of relevant evidence and potential for abuse.132 
Similarly, Texas employs a narrow version of the common interest 
doctrine and has codified it as such.133  Texas Rule of Evidence 503(b)(1)(C) 
extends attorney-client privilege to communications concerning a matter of 
common interest in the pending action.134  To align with this statutory 
definition, Texas courts refer to the doctrine as the “allied litigant doctrine” 
as opposed to the common interest doctrine.135  Texas, similar to New York, 
sought to limit the privilege to situations where the benefit and necessity are 
                                                          
v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Even where the non-party . . . faces no immediate 
liability, it can still be found to have a common interest with the party seeking to protect the 
communications.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). 
 127.   BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d at 816 n.6 (citing to cases in the First, Second, Fourth, 
Ninth, and Federal Circuits, and noting that only the Fifth Circuit has held that at least a threat of 
litigation is necessary); In re Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 711 (“[I]n looking at other cases discussing the 
[common interest] privilege in this circuit, it appears that there must be a palpable threat of litigation 
at the time of the communication, rather than a mere awareness that one’s questionable conduct 
might some day result in litigation, before communications . . . could qualify for protection.”).  
 128.   See Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 37–40. 
 129.   Id. at 37. 
 130.   See id.; Hyatt v. State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 962 N.Y.S.2d 282, 295–97 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013); Hudson Valley Marine, Inc. v. Town of Cortlandt, 816 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2006); Yemini v. Goldberg, 821 N.Y.S.2d 384, 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (quoting Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 676 N.Y.S.2d 727, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1998)). 
 131.   Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38. 
 132.   Id. 
 133.   See TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(C). 
 134.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 135.   In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 51–53 (Tex. 2012). 
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at their highest while also “restrict[ing] the opportunity for misuse.”136  The 
allied litigation doctrine also only applies to communications “between a 
client, or the client’s lawyer, to another party’s lawyer, [but] not the other 
party itself.”137 
While the national spectrum varies, it trends towards recognition of the 
common interest doctrine in some form.138  Kansas is in the minority of 
states that do not yet recognize any form of the doctrine.139 
F. The Uncertainty of the Common Interest Doctrine in Kansas 
Kansas does not yet recognize the common interest doctrine in any 
form.140  The Kansas Rules of Evidence lay out Kansas’s attorney-client 
privilege law and its exceptions, but do not explicitly recognize either the 
joint defense or the common interest doctrine.141  The 1984 criminal case 
State v. Maxwell142 is the only Kansas state court case truly discussing the 
joint defense doctrine and, while it appears to recognize the joint defense 
doctrine, more recent cases have questioned its validity.143  Although the 
common interest doctrine is regularly applied in Kansas federal courts, no 
state court has discussed or applied the doctrine.144 
1. The Joint Defense Doctrine in Kansas 
Kansas appears to recognize the common interest doctrine’s 
predecessor—the joint defense doctrine.145  Under Kansas’s attorney-client 
privilege statute, Kansas Statutes Annotated (K.S.A.) section 60-426(b)(5), 
attorney-client privilege does not apply to a communication “relevant to a 
matter of common interest between two or more clients if made by any of 
them to an attorney whom they have retained in common when offered in an 
action between any of such clients.”  Arguably this exception recognizes a 
joint client or joint defense privilege (for two or more clients sharing the 
same attorney) because without such a privilege this exception would be 
                                                          
 136.   Id. at 52 (quoting United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D. 383, 388 (M.D.N.C. 
2003)). 
 137.   Id. at 52–53. 
 138.   See supra notes 112–37 and accompanying text.  
 139.   See infra notes 163–78 and accompanying text.  
 140.   See discussion infra Section II.F.2. 
 141.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (Supp. 2016). 
 142.   691 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984). 
 143.   See discussion infra Sections II.F.1–2.  
 144.   See discussion infra Section II.F.2.  
 145.   See § 60-426(b)(5). 
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unnecessary.  However, the courts have not confirmed or denied such an 
argument, and there is limited case law on the subject, with Kansas courts 
only discussing the doctrine in two cases.146 
The Kansas Court of Appeals first applied the joint defense privilege in 
the criminal context in the 1984 case, State v. Maxwell.147  Defendant 
Johnny Maxwell previously shared counsel with two other defendants, and, 
at trial, the other defendants testified against Maxwell.148  Maxwell sought to 
admit evidence that this trial testimony was inconsistent with prior 
statements made in the presence of their common counsel.149  The trial court 
found that the attorney-client privilege applied to these statements and 
refused to admit the statements.150 
On appeal, Maxwell argued that attorney-client privilege was waived 
because the statements were made in the presence of all the defendants, and, 
in the alternative, if the statements were privileged, the privilege was waived 
when original counsel disclosed the information to the assistant district 
attorney.151  The Court of Appeals disagreed, and in affirming the trial court, 
recognized the joint defense privilege: 
Where two or more persons jointly consult an attorney concerning 
mutual concerns, their confidential communications with the attorney, 
although known to each other, will be privileged in controversies of 
either or both of the clients with the outside world. 
. . . 
The joint defense privilege encompasses shared communications “to 
the extent that they concern common issues and are intended to 
facilitate representation in possible subsequent proceedings.”  It is also 
essential that the codefendants have exchanged the information in 
confidence, “not . . . for the purpose of allowing unlimited publication 
and use, but rather . . . for the limited purpose of assisting in their 
common cause.”152 
                                                          
 146.   See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 975 P.2d 231, 239 (Kan. 
1999); Maxwell, 691 P.2d at 1320–21. 
 147.   691 P.2d at 1320–22. 
 148.   Id. at 1319.  
 149.   Id. 
 150.   Id. at 1319–21. 
 151.   Id. at 1319. 
 152.   Id. at 1320, 1321 (citations omitted) (first citing Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 
90 F.R.D. 21, 29 (N.D. Ill. 1980); then quoting Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th 
Cir. 1965); and then quoting Wilson P. Abraham Const. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 
253 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
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Furthermore, when a third party seeks to have those communications 
disclosed, none of the clients—not even a majority—can waive the 
privilege.153  However, the facts in Maxwell limited the holding to situations 
where multiple criminal defendants were commonly represented by one 
attorney.154 
Since Maxwell, the joint defense doctrine has been rarely mentioned, 
and never fully discussed, in a Kansas state court case.  Fifteen years after 
Maxwell, the Kansas Supreme Court declined to rule on the joint defense 
doctrine in the civil case Associated Wholesale Grocers v. Americold 
Corp.155  Although the parties referenced the joint defense doctrine in their 
briefs, the court declined to address it because none of the experts, parties, 
nor the district court referenced the statutory attorney-client privilege in 
K.S.A. section 60-426.156  However, the court questioned the validity of the 
doctrine: “Without a credible argument for recognition of the joint defense 
doctrine based on the language of the attorney-client privilege statute itself 
[K.S.A. section 60-426] proponents of the joint defense doctrine are 
vulnerable to attack.”157 
However, federal courts applying Kansas law have seemingly extended 
the Kansas state courts’ version of the joint defense doctrine.  In the civil 
case Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Judge John W. Lungstrum relied 
on Maxwell in holding that certain documents sought in discovery were 
privileged.158  Defendants were members of the Council for Tobacco 
Research (CTR), along with other members of the tobacco industry, and 
were represented by separate counsel.159  In discovery, plaintiff “sought all 
documents relat[ed] to the CTR special projects” but defendant claimed the 
documents were protected by attorney-client privilege under the joint 
defense doctrine.160  The court agreed with defendant in holding the joint 
defense doctrine includes “shared communications to the extent that they 
concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation in 
possible subsequent proceedings.”161  However, the information must have 
been shared in confidence solely for assisting the common cause.162 
                                                          
 153.   Id. at 1320. 
 154.   See id. at 1319–21. 
 155.   975 P.2d 231, 239 (Kan. 1999). 
 156.   Id. at 238–39. 
 157.   Id. at 239 (quoting Chris R. Pace, The State of Joint Defense Privilege, K.A.D.C. LEGAL 
LETTER (Kan. Ass’n of Def. Couns., Topeka, Kan.), Dec. 1998, at 5). 
 158.   167 F.R.D. 134, 139–40 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing Maxwell, 691 P.3d at 1321). 
 159.   See id. at 137. 
 160.   Id. at 137, 139. 
 161.   Id. at 139 (citing Maxwell, 691 P.3d at 1321). 
 162.   Id. (quoting Maxwell, 691 P.3d at 1321). 
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The status of joint defense doctrine in Kansas is uncertain to say the 
least.  As the common interest doctrine’s predecessor, this uncertainty leaves 
the common interest doctrine on unsteady ground. 
2. The Common Interest Doctrine in Kansas 
The common interest doctrine is currently non-existent under Kansas 
state law.  The Kansas Rules of Evidence are silent on the common interest 
doctrine and Kansas state courts have rarely mentioned it, never discussing it 
in detail or applying it.  Alternatively, Kansas federal courts have embraced 
the doctrine. 
While Kansas state courts have never fully discussed the common 
interest doctrine, the Kansas Court of Appeals briefly addressed it in Smith 
v. Philip Morris Cos.163  Smith brought a class action against a number of 
tobacco companies claiming they were conspiring to fix cigarette prices in 
Kansas.164  Discovery disputes over whether the joint-defense privilege is 
recognized under Kansas law prompted the court to appoint Special Master 
Judge Buchanan.165  The trial court concluded that Special Master Judge 
Buchanan correctly applied Kansas law when he ruled that privilege was 
waived when communications were shared with jointly-aligned co-parties.166  
In doing so, Buchanan rejected both the joint defense doctrine and the 
common interest doctrine.167  Ironically, the trial court cited State v. Maxwell 
and Associated Wholesale Grocers in supporting a rejection of the 
doctrine.168  Defendants sought review of the trial court’s order by filing a 
petition for writ of mandamus to the Kansas Supreme Court.169  Numerous 
groups filed amicus briefs arguing Judge Smith’s ruling was erroneous on 
the common interest doctrine issue.170  The Kansas Supreme Court issued an 
                                                          
 163.   See 335 P.3d 644, 661–62 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); Amended Brief & Cross-Appeal, supra 
note 2, at *17–24. 
 164.   Amended Brief & Cross-Appeal, supra note 2, at *1–3; Smith, 335 P.3d at 650. 
 165.   Smith, 335 P.3d at 661. 
 166.   See Amended Brief & Cross-Appeal, supra note 2, at *15. 
 167.   See id. 
 168.   See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Kansas Ass’n of Defense Counsel, Philip Morris USA Inc. 
v. Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court of Seward County (Smith), No. 07-99546-S (Kan. Mar. 13, 
2008), 2008 WL 1724166, at *11 [hereinafter Amicus Brief of the KADC]; Greg A. Drumwright & 
Michael G. Jones, KADC Files Amicus Brief in Support of Joint Defense and Common Interest 
Privilege, KAN. DEF. J., Spring 2008, at 3, 
http://www.kadc.org/Portals/0/Content_Newsletter/08Spring.pdf. 
 169.   Amended Brief & Cross-Appeal, supra note 2, at *16; Drumwright & Jones, supra note 
168, at 3.  See also Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court of Seward 
County (Smith), No. 99,546 (Kan. Apr. 24, 2008). 
 170.   See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the KADC, supra note 168; Brief of Amicus Curiae Product 
Liability Advisory Council, Inc. in Support of Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, Philip Morris USA 
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order denying the defendants’ petition for mandamus on procedural grounds 
in which it emphasized that it was not expressing an opinion on the validity 
of either the joint defense or common interest doctrine.171  In not flat-out 
rejecting the doctrines, the court preserved the issue for another day.172 
Conversely, federal courts applying Kansas law recognize the common 
interest doctrine and have applied it on several occasions. In Sawyer v. 
Southwest Airlines, the United States District Court of Kansas did not find 
the lack of Kansas statutes or cases recognizing the common interest 
doctrine to be fatal.173  Southwest shared documents with its insurer, Global, 
and Sawyer claimed this waived attorney-client privilege.174  Southwest 
argued this was not a waiver because Global was a client of the same 
attorney, and Global’s claims attorney requested legal advice in the 
matter.175  The court noted it did not matter whether the court applied 
Kansas or federal attorney-client privilege law because the law is the same 
under both.176  Magistrate Judge Waxse found that Southwest met the 
elements of the common interest doctrine, and held that for the doctrine to 
attach, the two parties must share a common interest in “securing legal 
advice related to the same matter—and that the communications [must] be 
made to advance” the common interest.177  Further, “the nature of the 
interest [must] be identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely 
commercial.”178  Thus, while the common interest doctrine is alive and well 
in Kansas federal courts, Kansas state courts’ failure to recognize the 
doctrine leaves attorneys and parties uncertain about what communications 
may waive or retain attorney-client privilege and disadvantages them as 
compared to other jurisdictions. 
                                                          
Inc. v. Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court of Seward County (Smith), No. 07-99546-S, (Kan. Mar. 
12, 2008), 2008 WL 1724167 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council].  
 171.   See Drumwright & Jones, supra note 168, at 3; Amended Brief & Cross-Appeal, supra 
note 2, at *20–24.  See also Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court of 
Seward County (Smith), No. 99,546 (Kan. Apr. 24, 2008). 
 172.   Drumwright & Jones, supra note 168, at 3. 
 173.   Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines, Nos. Civ.A.01-2385-KHV, Civ.A.01-2386-KHV, 2002 WL 
31928442, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 2002) (holding the common interest doctrine was satisfied 
because Global’s claims attorney retained Southwest’s attorney to provide “legal advice in 
connection with all matters” related to the consolidated cases, and she also “requested and obtained 
legal advice from [Southwest’s attorney] in connection with” related matters). 
 174.   Id. at *1–3. 
 175.   Id. at *2. 
 176.   Id. 
 177.   Id. at *3 (quoting First Pac. Networks, Inc. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 163 F.R.D. 574, 581 
(N.D. Cal. 1995)). 
 178.   Id. (quoting Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Research Corp. & Research Corp. Techs, Inc., No. 
01CIV.8115MBMFM, 2002 WL 1728566, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
While the common interest doctrine’s jurisdictional inconsistency is far 
from ideal, Kansas’s failure to recognize the doctrine in any form is 
especially problematic.  Kansas should recognize the common interest 
doctrine to: provide clarity and certainty for Kansas attorneys and their 
clients; further the goals of attorney-client privilege; promote efficiency and 
eliminate unnecessary costs; and align itself with the national trend and 
highly persuasive courts.  The means Kansas chooses is not as important as 
the ends, in that Kansas should recognize a form that is clearly defined, thus 
increasing the value of the doctrine and decreasing the risks. 
To accomplish these goals, Kansas should recognize a fairly broad 
version of the common interest doctrine.  The elements of an ideal Kansas 
common interest doctrine include: a communication otherwise protected by 
attorney-client privilege; made between two parties sharing a common legal 
interest; made in furtherance of the common interest; and that the privilege 
has not otherwise been waived. 
While the common interest doctrine is ripe for discussion in Kansas 
courts, Kansas attorneys should be wary of relying on the doctrine in the 
meantime.  However, there are a number of things Kansas attorneys can do 
to help sway the presumption toward privilege. 
A. Why Kansas Should Recognize the Common Interest Doctrine 
The current state of not only the common interest doctrine, but also the 
joint defense privilege in Kansas is highly unsettled.  While State v. Maxwell 
appeared to explicitly recognize the joint defense privilege in at least the 
criminal context,179  Associated Wholesale Grocers and Philip Morris Cos. 
questioned the validity of or declined to apply the doctrines to the civil 
context.180  This uncertainty is problematic for attorneys, and unfair to their 
clients. 
It creates a problematic conflict between Kansas law and the national 
trend.  Moreover, it discourages parties from disclosing attorney-client 
privileged information to commonly interested parties and “undermines the 
goals of the attorney-client privilege” in addition to a less efficient and more 
expensive judicial system.181  A recognition of the common interest doctrine 
                                                          
 179.   691 P.2d 1316, 1320–21 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984). 
 180.   Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 975 P.2d 231, 238–39 (Kan. 
1999); Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644, 661–62 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008); see Amicus Brief 
of the KADC, supra note 168, at *1.  
 181.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 66, 85–90.  
2017 LAST MAN STANDING 819 
would clarify Kansas’s attorney-client privilege statute and align Kansas law 
with highly persuasive courts—Kansas federal courts and Delaware.  Kansas 
has long followed Delaware corporate law, and the United States District 
Court for the District of Kansas regularly applies Kansas state law.182  Both 
jurisdictions recognize a broad common interest doctrine and apply it 
regularly.183 
As it currently stands, Kansas attorneys and their clients cannot be sure 
whether their case will be the one that the court finally decides to apply the 
common interest doctrine to, or whether their communication to a third party 
will waive attorney-client privilege.  Recognizing the common interest 
doctrine would allow Kansas to serve the underlying purpose of attorney-
client privilege, and create fluidity with courts that Kansas aligns closely 
with.184 
1. Failure to Recognize the Common Interest Doctrine Creates a 
Problematic Conflict for Kansas Attorneys and Parties 
Kansas is one of the last jurisdictions to not recognize the common 
interest doctrine in some capacity, and as such, Kansas attorneys and parties 
are at a huge disadvantage under conflict of law principles.  This is 
especially problematic in cases where similar lawsuits are pending, or have 
been filed in multiple states against the same defendants.185  Where 
“privilege is upheld by one body of law, but denied by [another],” problems 
arise.186  “[I]f a Kansas court holds that there is no common interest” 
privilege and “orders the disclosure” of communications shared among 
parties outside of Kansas, “Kansas law will [essentially] negate the privilege 
law of [the] other jurisdictions.”187  Thus, opposing counsel will be able to 
obtain information that otherwise would have been privileged in that 
jurisdiction, but negated by Kansas.188 
A Kansas rejection of the common interest doctrine would also have 
consequences on the doctrine nationally.  It would be impossible for co-
parties to confidently share privileged information in states where the 
common interest doctrine is alive and well, for fear of a potential similar suit 
                                                          
 182.   See discussion infra notes 212–234 and accompanying text.  
 183.   See discussion infra notes 212–234 and accompanying text. 
 184.   See discussion infra notes 212–234 and accompanying text.  
 185.   Amicus Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council, supra note 170, at *1. 
 186.   Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1369 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing differences 
between federal and state privilege law). 
 187.   See Amicus Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council, supra note 170, at *8; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (AM. LAW INST. 1988). 
 188.   Amicus Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council, supra note 170, at *8. 
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in Kansas.189  Additionally, if Kansas were a “lone ranger” in rejecting the 
common interest doctrine, parties would have an incentive to file in Kansas 
in order to gain access to communications that would be otherwise 
privileged under other states’ law.190  This could lead to Kansas courts being 
swamped with claims in an effort to avoid an evidentiary privilege that the 
majority of other jurisdictions recognize.191 
2. The Common Interest Doctrine is Necessary to Best Serve the 
Purpose of Attorney-Client Privilege 
Kansas’s recognition of the common interest doctrine would serve the 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege by encouraging the “free flow of 
information . . . [and] enhancing the effectiveness of counsel.”192  If the 
purpose of attorney-client privilege is to be served, attorneys and their 
clients must be able to predict with some certainty what communications or 
discussions will be privileged.193  Kansas’s failure to recognize the doctrine, 
or even engage in a guiding discussion about it, makes it difficult for Kansas 
attorneys to predict what communications will remain privileged if shared 
with a commonly interested third party.  Kansas attorneys can hardly serve 
their clients in the most effective manner when the courts have left them 
with such uncertainty about an integral privilege. 
Critics of the common interest doctrine argue that “it broadens the 
attorney-client privilege, which is generally construed narrowly” in favor of 
“the over-arching search for [the] truth.”194  However, the common interest 
doctrine attaches only to communications that would already be protected by 
attorney-client privilege.195  It does not broaden attorney-client privilege 
because careful parties arguably would not share those communications in 
the first place.  An appropriate application of the doctrine allows attorney-
client privilege to function in a way that best serves its goals—”to encourage 
the free flow of information and to enhance the quality of legal advice”—
                                                          
 189.   Id. at *8–9. 
 190.   See id. at *9 (assuming the parties meet all other jurisdictional criteria).  
 191.   Id. 
 192.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 57; see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, John 
Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 
243–44 (2d Cir. 1989)); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
 193.   Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). 
 194.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 68; see also Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 34–40 (N.Y. 2016) (explaining the development of the joint defense and 
common interest doctrines and weighing the benefits of privilege with the potential loss of 
evidence). 
 195.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 55–56. 
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especially when interests are aligned.196  When the common interest doctrine 
is clearly defined, it allows both attorneys and courts to predict and respect 
attorney-client privilege.197 
3. Recognizing the Common Interest Doctrine Promotes Efficiency and 
Eliminates Unnecessary Costs 
The common interest doctrine encourages parties with a common legal 
interest to seek assistance, obtain sound legal advice, and plan their actions 
in order to comply with the law.198  Thus, by avoiding litigation in the first 
place, both the judicial system and the parties avoid unnecessary 
expenditures of time and money.  Additionally, collaboration between co-
parties reduces time and expenses and facilitates better preparation, thus 
advancing the parties’ representation and streamlining the judicial 
process.199 
Rejecting the common interest doctrine leads to unnecessary costs 
because it requires parties to unnecessarily duplicate work.  Especially in 
litigation situations, if parties on the same side cannot share information 
without waiving attorney-client privilege, they are forced to hire multiple 
experts, write duplicative pleadings, and engage in large discovery 
disputes.200  In Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., the court was forced to appoint a 
special master in order to deal with the volume of discovery disputes 
regarding whether the joint defense doctrine and the common interest 
doctrine were recognized in Kansas courts.201  Smith is unlikely to be the last 
case with this issue, and by recognizing the common interest doctrine, 
Kansas courts can avoid the expenses associated with such appointments in 
litigation.  Additionally, as discussed above, a rejection of the common 
interest doctrine would burden Kansas with claims solely because their 
privilege law departs from that of other jurisdictions.202 
 
                                                          
 196.   Id. at 51. 
 197.   Id. at 67–68. 
 198.   United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re 
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 199.   See In re Qwest Commuc’ns Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the 
joint defense doctrine or common interest doctrine “advances the representation of the party and the 
attorney’s preparation of the case”); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981) 
(noting that recognizing the joint defense privilege “makes savings in expense and effort likely”). 
 200.   See Amicus Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council, supra note 170, at *8–12. 
 201.   See Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644, 661–62 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).  
 202.   See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
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4. K.S.A section 60-426(b) Implicitly Recognizes the Common Interest 
Doctrine 
The common interest doctrine is implicit in Kansas’s attorney-client 
privilege statute; thus, an explicit recognition of the doctrine aligns with 
Kansas’s current law.  However, before recognizing a formal version of the 
common interest doctrine, Kansas should confirm the joint defense 
doctrine’s validity. While State v. Maxwell originally recognized the joint 
defense doctrine in Kansas in the criminal context, its validity has since 
become unclear.203  However, as it stands, the language of Kansas’s 
attorney-client privilege statute may already recognize the joint defense and 
joint client doctrines. 
Under K.S.A. section 60-426(a), communications between an attorney 
and her client are privileged when made in the “course of that relationship 
and in professional confidence.”204  K.S.A. section 60-426(b) lists the 
exceptions to attorney-client privilege.205  Subsection 60-426(b)(5) provides: 
“Such privileges shall not extend to a communication: . . . relevant to a 
matter of common interest between two or more clients if made by any of 
them to an attorney whom they have retained in common when offered in an 
action between any of such clients.”206  This exception applies when an 
attorney has multiple clients in the same case, and those clients are later 
engaged adversely to one another; communications between the client and 
that common attorney are not privileged in the later adverse action.207 
It seems clear that this language acts as a codification of Maxwell, and 
the lack of civil versus criminal and plaintiff versus defendant language 
arguably extends Maxwell to civil co-parties as well.  The language supports 
the proposition that the Kansas legislature intended confidential 
communications among jointly aligned co-parties and their common counsel 
to retain attorney-client privilege.  There would be no exception to the 
privilege if those communications were not privileged to begin with.208  The 
statute makes no mention of whether the parties, before the action between 
them, were aligned as plaintiffs or defendants.209  Thus, it seems clear that 
this is a recognition of at least the joint defense/joint-client doctrine.  
However, Judge Smith’s ruling in Philip Morris Cos. denied the existence of 
                                                          
 203.   See discussion supra Section II.F.  
 204.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426(a) (Supp. 2016). 
 205.   § 60-426(b)(1)–(5). 
 206.   § 60-426(b)(5) (emphasis added). 
 207.   See id. 
 208.   See Amicus Brief of the KADC, supra note 168, at *11–15. 
 209.   See § 60-426. 
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such a privilege.210  While a recognition of the joint defense/joint client 
doctrines and the common interest doctrine would best serve the attorneys 
and clients of Kansas, a clarification either way is necessary. 
It should be noted that Kansas courts do not need statutory authority 
under K.S.A. section 60-426 to recognize the common interest doctrine.  
While the common interest doctrine can be codified, it is not a new 
privilege, but an extension of attorney-client privilege as a common law 
privilege.211  Therefore, the court is free to recognize the common interest 
doctrine through common law as well.  Nevertheless, this Comment argues 
that the language of section 60-426 indeed already supports such a ruling.  
Additionally, even if the statute implicitly recognizes the joint defense 
and/or common interest doctrine, it is not clear enough to be controlling.  
Thus, Kansas courts, or the legislature, need to provide attorneys with more 
certainty, whether through common law or statute. 
5. Highly Persuasive Jurisdictions Recognize the Common Interest 
Doctrine 
The national trend supports Kansas’s recognition of the common interest 
doctrine because the majority of states and federal circuits already recognize 
the common interest doctrine.  This trend is persuasive in itself.  Moreover, 
two jurisdictions especially persuasive to Kansas—Kansas federal courts 
and Delaware—recognize and apply the common interest doctrine 
consistently.212 
a. Kansas Federal Courts 
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas and the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals have explicitly recognized both the joint defense 
and common interest doctrines.213  While these decisions are not binding on 
Kansas state courts, Kansas state courts should follow in the steps of their 
federal counterparts in recognizing the common interest doctrine. 
                                                          
 210.   See Amended Brief & Cross-Appeal, supra note 2, at *14–24; Drumwright & Jones, supra 
note 168, at 3. 
 211.   See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 212.   See discussion infra Section III.A.5. 
 213.   See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006); Frontier 
Ref. Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 705 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Dillard, No. 11-
1098-JTM-KGG, 2013 WL 74316, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Jan. 7, 2013); High Point SARL v. Sprint 
Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024, at *5–9 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 2012); Sawyer v. 
Sw. Airlines, Nos. Civ.A.01-2385-KHV, Civ.A.01-2386-KHV, 2002 WL 31928442, at *2–4 (D. 
Kan. Dec. 23, 2002). 
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Because Kansas federal courts applying Kansas law are especially 
persuasive, the District of Kansas’s common interest doctrine recognition 
should influence Kansas state courts.214  Federal courts look to state law in 
deciding privilege questions when presented with both federal and state 
claims.215  The District of Kansas (applying Kansas law) applied the 
common interest doctrine in Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines, noting that the 
lack of Kansas case law or statute recognizing the common interest doctrine 
was not fatal.216  In support of the ruling, it quoted the Kansas Supreme 
Court: “[T]he attorney-client privilege is important to the administration of 
justice and should not be set aside lightly.”217  Because the District of 
Kansas applied the common interest doctrine while looking to Kansas 
privilege law for guidance, a Kansas state court recognition logically 
follows. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also recognizes the doctrine: 
“[W]hen the disclosure is to a party with a common interest, the . . . 
‘common interest’ doctrine provides an exception to waiver because 
disclosure advances the representation of the party and the attorney’s 
preparation of the case.”218  Additionally, the Tenth Circuit, interpreting 
Kansas privilege law, cited the Kansas attorney-client privilege statute’s 
broad language to conclude that Kansas prefers a broad approach to 
privilege.219  While Kansas courts are not required to follow Tenth Circuit 
decisions, they are considered persuasive authority.220 
When Kansas statutes are modeled after federal statutes, federal 
decisions interpreting those statutes are persuasive for interpreting and 
applying the Kansas statute.221  While the Kansas and federal attorney-client 
                                                          
 214.   See, e.g., State v. Dillingham, No. 99,189, 2008 WL 5428180, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 
24, 2008) (discussing the federal impact on state court’s creation and modification of the prison 
mailbox rule, noting that “this court has consistently been guided by federal precedent in addressing 
the rule and has treated federal law as very persuasive authority”). 
 215.   See FED. R. EVID. 501; Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1368–69 (10th Cir. 
1997) (first citing Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995); then citing FED. 
R. EVID. 501, and White v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1414, 1424 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 216.   Sawyer, 2002 WL 31928442, at *3. 
 217.   Id. (quoting Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chartered v. Louisburg Grain 
Co., 824 P.2d 933, 940 (Kan. 1992)). 
 218.   In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006).  
 219.   Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1371 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (1995)). 
 220.   Westar Energy, Inc. v. Wittig, 235 P.3d 515, 525 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. 
Thompson, 166 P.3d 1015, 1039 (Kan. 2007)) (affirming trial court’s decision which relied on 
Delaware and Tenth Circuit law, among other states, to rule on an issue of first impression and 
finding that the “Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions are persuasive authority . . . .”). 
 221.   Ternes v. Galichia, 305 P.3d 617, 620–21 (Kan. 2013) (applying the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to interpret the Kansas intervention statute).  
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privilege statues are not identical, they function as such.222  As the Sawyer 
court stated, whether the court applied Kansas or federal law makes no 
difference, because the elements of attorney-client privilege under each are 
essentially identical.223  Thus, Kansas should follow federal precedents 
applying Kansas attorney-client privilege and, subsequently, the common 
interest doctrine. 
Kansas would not be the first jurisdiction to recognize the common 
interest doctrine based off its respective federal court.  The Court of Appeals 
of Michigan took a similar approach in recognizing the common interest 
doctrine in D’Alessandro Contracting Group, LLC v. Wright.224  The court 
reasoned that the “[f]ederal courts’ application of the common-interest 
doctrine [was] instructive.”225  “[B]ecause both the state and federal rules” 
were “virtually identical,” Michigan relied on federal cases for guidance in 
the state court’s recognition of the common interest doctrine.226  Kansas 
should follow Michigan’s example and use the federal courts’ recognition of 
the common interest doctrine as guidance for Kansas state courts. 
b. Delaware 
Delaware recognizes a broad version of the common interest doctrine 
and Kansas’s failure to recognize the doctrine disadvantages Kansas 
corporations relying on Delaware law.  Kansas has a long history of reliance 
on Delaware corporate law for guidance in applying Kansas corporation law, 
as most of it is “nearly identical” to Delaware’s.227  While attorney-client 
privilege and corporation law are clearly very different aspects of the law, 
they become remarkably intermingled in the application of the common 
interest doctrine.228  As such, Kansas should look to Delaware’s formation of 
the common interest doctrine. 
Delaware’s common interest doctrine is codified in the Delaware 
Uniform Rules of Evidence 502(b)(3): 
                                                          
 222.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (Supp. 2016); FED. R. EVID. 502.  But see Sawyer, 2002 
WL 31928442, at *2. 
 223.   Sawyer, 2002 WL 31928442, at *2. 
 224.   862 N.W.2d 466, 473–74 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). 
 225.   Id. at 474. 
 226.   Id. at 474–77 (quoting Leibel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 646 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2002) (using the “virtually identical” reasoning in interpreting the state’s work product doctrine)). 
 227.   Hesston Corp. v. Kays (In re Hesston Corp.), 870 P.2d 17, 42 (Kan. 1994); see also Kan. 
Heart Hosp., L.L.C. v. Idbeis, 184 P.3d 866, 878–79 (Kan. 2008).  
 228.   See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–96 (1981); King, supra note 15, at 
1421. 
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A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the 
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the 
client . . . (3) by the client or the client’s representative or the client’s 
lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative 
of a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest . . . . 
The comments to Rule 502(b)(3) confirm that the doctrine applies absent 
pending litigation.229  By accepting Delaware’s corporation law, but ignoring 
its interpretation of the common interest doctrine, Kansas corporations and 
their attorneys are forced to mix and match law.  The possibility of relying 
on the wrong precedent creates several issues including potential malpractice 
or the inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privilege. 
Delaware has a long reputation of being one of the best states to 
incorporate in.230  Kansas, among other states, has modeled its corporate law 
off Delaware’s to remain attractive to businesses.231  Delaware arguably 
chose to not require pending or anticipated litigation to maintain its 
corporate friendly climate. 
Kansas corporations and attorneys are at a disadvantage because of this 
conflict between Kansas and Delaware law.  The Kansas Secretary of State 
reported a record number of businesses formed in both 2014 and 2015.232  
The total number of Kansas business entities in 2015 was 179,665.233  If 
Kansas wants to continue this increase in business entities, it should look to 
more than just Delaware’s corporation law.  If Kansas recognizes the 
common interest doctrine, it is essential that it does so in a way that allows 
the privilege to function in certain forms of business transactions.  This 
would provide Kansas attorneys with a more predictable privilege and would 
                                                          
 229.   DEL. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) cmt. (“D.R.E. 502(b) tracks U.R.E. 502(b) except that the word 
‘therein’ and the words ‘party in a pending action and concerning’ were deleted and the word ‘in’ 
was inserted in lieu thereof in D.R.E. 502(b)(3).  The purpose of this change was . . . to make it clear 
that D.R.E. 502(b)(3) applies even if no litigation is actually pending.”). 
 230.   See Randy J. Holland, Del. Bus. Courts: Litig. Leadership, Presentation at Corporation 
Service Company Continuing Legal Education: Delaware’s Far-Reaching Influence on Corporate 
Law in the United States and Abroad 1–3 (Jan. 11, 2013), 
https://www.cscglobal.com/cscglobal/pdfs/Outline_20130111.pdf (outline of presentation); see also 
House Bill 2261 – Enacting the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA): H.B. 
2261 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 2012 Leg. Sess. 2 (Kan. Feb. 2, 2012) (statement of William 
Quick, on behalf of Kan. Bar Ass’n, in opposition of H.B. 2261) [hereinafter Letter from William 
Quick], 
http://kslegislature.net/li_2012/b2011_12/committees/misc/ctte_h_jud_1_20120202_04_other.pdf.  
 231.   See Holland, supra note 230, at 2 (citing Letter from William Quick, supra note 230); see 
also Letter from William Quick, supra note 230, at 1–2. 
 232.   Press Release, Kris Kobach, Kan. Sec’y of State, Total New Business Formations in 
Kansas Sets Another Record, KAN. OFFICE SEC’Y OF STATE (Feb. 8, 2016), 
http://www.sos.ks.gov/other/news_releases/PR_2016/NR_2016_2_8.pdf. 
 233.   Id. 
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incentivize Kansas businesses to negotiate and deal with one another in a 
way that complies with the law and reduces secrecy.  Additionally, it allows 
Kansas corporate attorneys to rely on the law that has guided them for 
decades—Delaware’s. 
B. How Kansas Should Recognize the Common Interest Doctrine 
Courts have adopted the common interest doctrine in several ways: 
some have codified their own version of the doctrine; some have modeled 
their code from Proposed Rule of Evidence 503(b); while others have left 
the doctrine to common law.234  Ideally, Kansas should codify the common 
interest doctrine to ensure that the doctrine is well defined and has 
appropriate boundaries.  Kansas should adopt a broad version of the 
common interest doctrine to best serve the underlying purposes of both the 
doctrine and attorney-client privilege. 
To ensure that the common interest doctrine is not abused and best 
serves its purpose—to encourage the free flow of information—Kansas must 
define the boundaries of the doctrine.  Ideally, the elements for Kansas’s 
recognition include: (1) a communication that is otherwise protected by 
attorney-client privilege; (2) made between two parties sharing a common 
legal interest; (3) the communication was made in furtherance of the 
common interest; and (4) the parties did not otherwise waive the privilege. 
Jurisdictions agree that the doctrine cannot attach if the underlying 
communication would not have been protected by attorney-client privilege 
or if the parties have otherwise waived the privilege.  As an initial matter, 
Kansas courts should ensure that the underlying communication qualifies as 
attorney-client privileged as defined by K.S.A. section 60-426(a): 
“[C]ommunications found by the judge to have been between an attorney 
and such attorney’s client in the course of that relationship and in 
professional confidence, are privileged, and a client has a privilege . . . .”235  
Once the court determines that the underlying communication is attorney-
client privileged and the parties did not otherwise waive the privilege, it can 
turn to the applicability of the common interest doctrine.  Thus, this 
Comment focuses on how Kansas should define more disputed elements: 
“between two parties sharing a common legal interest;” and “the 
communication was made in furtherance of the common interest.” 
                                                          
 234.   See supra notes 112–39 and accompanying text.  
 235.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426(a) (Supp. 2016). 
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1. Between Two Parties Sharing a Common Legal Interest 
First, Kansas should not define the doctrine based on the position of the 
parties (criminal co-defendants; civil co-defendants; civil co-plaintiffs, etc.).  
The national trend applies the common interest doctrine to parties sharing a 
sufficiently common interest, regardless of their position.236  Moreover, 
restricting the doctrine based on the position of the parties creates confusion 
between the common interest doctrine and other doctrines such as the joint 
defense or joint client doctrines.237  Thus, Kansas should apply the common 
interest doctrine to qualified parties, regardless of their position. 
Second, Kansas should define a “common legal interest” with some 
flexibility—the interest should be substantially common, but not necessarily 
identical.  Yet, Kansas should join the majority of other jurisdictions in 
requiring that the interest is legal, and not solely commercial.238  Parties 
clearly have a common legal interest when they are engaged as co-parties in 
litigation.239  However, outside of the litigation context, whether parties 
share a common legal interest can be highly fact dependent. 
In situations where the commonality is at issue, Kansas courts should 
require that the parties’ common interests outweigh any of the parties’ 
adverse interests.  Using a balancing test ensures that the courts can evaluate 
the common interest with some discretion and act as a “gate keeper” for 
parties attempting to use the doctrine to cheat the system.240  At the same 
time, parties seeking privilege under the doctrine for the furtherance of a 
truly common interest should have no trouble showing that to the court. 
However, Kansas should consciously require that parties share a true 
“legal interest.”  For example, in the transactional context, Kansas should be 
wary of applying the doctrine to communications made outside of due 
diligence.  Courts should consider whether the transaction will lead to a 
“transfer of liabilities from one party to the other” as a basis for whether the 
parties shared a common interest.241  This reasoning can apply to numerous 
situations including mergers, acquisitions, patent sales, and negotiations.  
Applying the doctrine outside these transactional situations raises the risk of 
parties using the doctrine for leverage or to persuade investors as opposed to 
                                                          
 236.   See supra notes 112–39 and accompanying text.  
 237.   See discussion supra Section II.C. 
 238.   See discussion supra Section II.D.1.  
 239.   Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Megan-Racine Assocs., Inc. (In re Megan-Racine 
Assocs., Inc.), 189 B.R. 562, 573 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 240.   See Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 76–78; Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. 
Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1975).  
 241.   King, supra note 15, at 1435–36. 
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compliance with the law.  Situations involving a transfer of liability are more 
likely to serve the interests of parties with actual common interests, instead 
of using common interest for secrecy.242 
Third, and most importantly, Kansas should not require pending or 
anticipated litigation for the common interest doctrine to attach.  Requiring 
pending or anticipated litigation departs from attorney-client privilege’s 
common law roots.243  The underlying purpose of both attorney-client 
privilege and the common interest doctrine is “to encourage the free flow of 
information and to enhance the quality of legal advice.”244  Attorney-client 
privilege does not require pending or anticipated litigation to attach, most 
notably because litigation is not always the motivating factor for a client’s 
communication of private information.245 
There are a number of important legal situations outside of litigation 
where parties have common legal interests.246  For example, the corporate 
attorney-client privilege encourages seeking legal advice in order to comply 
with the complex regulations many companies face.247  Given that 
corporations generally face more complex legal issues than individuals, they 
likely seek legal advice more often, and thus have a larger number of 
privileged communications.248  A number of other courts have joined this 
line of reasoning, as explained by the United States District Court for the 
District of Connecticut: “The timing and setting of the communications are 
important indicators of the measure of common interest; the shared interest 
necessary to justify extending the privilege to encompass intercorporate 
communications appears most clearly in cases of co-defendants and 
impending litigations but is not necessarily limited to those situations.”249  
The “real inquiry” underlying the common interest doctrine “is not whether 
litigation is pending or anticipated, but whether the interest” is common and 
legal.250  Moreover, the idea of “anticipated litigation” is ambiguous and 
                                                          
 242.   See id.  
 243.   See Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 41–43 
(N.Y. 2016) (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 244.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 51; see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, John 
Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 
243–44 (2d Cir. 1989)); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440–41 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1987).  
 245.   Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 41 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 246.   Sunshine, supra note 14, at 843–44. 
 247.   See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392–95 (1981). 
 248.   King, supra note 15, at 1421 & nn.55–56.  
 249.   SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 513 (D. Conn. 1976). 
 250.   Schaffzin, supra note 18, at 75.  
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vague, requiring additional judicial interpretation.251  Arguably, parties 
engaged in high risk industries could be anticipating litigation at any time. 
There are valid arguments against protecting communications outside 
the presence of pending or anticipated litigation.  The “litigation required” 
approach ensures a narrow application of the doctrine and creates a 
predictable categorical rule, limiting courts’ discretion.252  Requiring 
anticipated or pending litigation eliminates the doctrine’s application in 
settings where parties arguably never have a truly identical legal interest—
where parties are adverse or sitting on opposite sides of the negotiating 
table.253  This type of a categorical rule would simplify application of the 
doctrine and thus could be more cost and time efficient for the courts.254  
However, while these arguments are valid, they choose predictability and 
ease of application over serving the purposes of attorney-client privilege and 
the common interest doctrine.  Moreover, a categorical rule goes against the 
Supreme Court’s articulation of corporate attorney-client privilege, as 
articulated in Upjohn, and would impose an evidentiary rule on private 
transactions.255 
Rejecting a litigation requirement would provide Kansas attorneys more 
certainty about what communications are privileged and encourage the free 
flow of information.  Additionally, by not imposing a litigation requirement, 
Kansas courts would align themselves with similarly aligned, persuasive 
jurisdictions—the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and Delaware.256 
2. The Communication Was Made in Furtherance of the Common 
Interest 
Kansas should require that the communication is made in furtherance of 
the common interest to ensure that parties are only sharing privileged 
communications that actually relate to their common interest.  For example, 
there are situations where two parties clearly have a common legal interest, 
but they may also have a number of common non-legal interests.  The 
existence of a common interest is not sufficient to warrant privilege, rather, 
                                                          
 251.   See Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 45 (N.Y. 
2016) (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 252.   King, supra note 15, at 1432–33.  
 253.   See Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 37–40 (majority opinion); King, supra note 15, at 1432–33.  
 254.   See King, supra note 15, at 1432–37. 
 255.   See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392–93 (1981); King, supra note 15, at 
1421, 1427–29 (discussing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 310–11 
(N.D. Cal. 1987)). 
 256.   See discussion supra notes 213–33 and accompanying text. 
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the parties must demonstrate a collective cooperation in developing a 
common legal strategy.257  If Kansas allowed parties with a common interest 
to claim privilege for all communications between them, the doctrine would 
become too broad and susceptible to abuse. 
Additionally, Kansas should require the communications to be made 
through each party’s respective counsel, as opposed to between the parties 
themselves.  Again, if parties with a common interest could claim privilege 
on all communications between them, the doctrine becomes boundless.  
Requiring the communication be made between the attorneys ensures that 
the interest is legal, and creates a more definite boundary for where the 
privilege applies.  This requirement is also beneficial to discovery, as 
communications eligible for the common interest privilege would have 
already been filtered through counsel.  Kansas should make clear that any 
communications between the parties themselves, regardless of how common 
their interest, would constitute a waiver of privilege. 
C. What Kansas Attorneys Can Do in the Meantime 
Kansas should recognize the common interest doctrine either judicially 
or codified through the legislature.  The doctrine is long overdue for 
discussion in Kansas, but it would be unwise for parties to rely on it in the 
meantime.  While State v. Maxwell has not been overruled, is technically 
still good law, and arguably can be relied on, the more recent cases 
questioning the validity of Maxwell should serve as a warning to parties 
seeking to use the joint defense privilege, and especially the common 
interest doctrine.258  Kansas attorneys seeking to use the common interest 
doctrine should be wary to do so in any Kansas state court, as the court’s 
response is unpredictable and potentially unfavorable. 
However, as many attorneys practice in multiple jurisdictions, it is 
helpful to know what parties can do to sway the presumption towards 
privilege.  Courts have identified several things parties can do to support a 
finding of privilege in a common interest situation including the parties’ 
efforts to maintain confidentiality and the existence of a written agreement.  
Parties’ handling of privileged communications has also swayed courts 
towards a finding of privilege.259  Thus, parties should take sufficient effort 
to maintain the communications’ confidentiality, such as limiting the 
number of copies, limiting the shared communication to what is absolutely 
                                                          
 257.   See In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 496–97 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010). 
 258.   See discussion supra Section II.F. 
 259.   See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard, 115 F.R.D. at 309. 
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necessary, restricting who can access the copies, and requesting the return of 
the copies.260 
A written agreement may not be required under the common interest 
doctrine, but courts have found them to be persuasive as evidence of a 
common interest.  Non-disclosure agreements, joint defense agreements, 
common interest agreements, or confidentiality agreements can be especially 
persuasive.261  In fact, depending on the court, parties risk an adverse finding 
of common interest prior to the execution of a written agreement.262  The 
written agreement should tie the agreement to pending or anticipated 
litigation and include a choice of law provision.263  If possible, parties using 
a written common interest agreement should choose a jurisdiction that 
recognizes a broad scope of common interest protection—such as 
Massachusetts or Delaware—as the governing law of the agreement.  
Additionally, each communication should be marked “Privileged and 
Confidential/Attorney Work-Product” and ideally contain some legal advice. 
However, the existence of a written agreement will not create a privilege 
where one does not rightfully exist.264  Therefore, attorneys should educate 
themselves on whether the jurisdiction recognizes the common interest 
doctrine, and to what extent.  The existence of a written agreement will not 
terminate the requirements of both attorney-client privilege and the common 
interest doctrine—the parties must still establish that the communications are 
privileged under both.265 
                                                          
 260.   See, e.g., id. (holding that privilege was not waived when “defendant took substantial steps 
to assure that GEC maintained the confidentiality of the letter[:]  [o]nly two copies were transmitted 
to GEC; GEC was instructed that no further copies were to be made; both copies were returned to 
defendant’s counsel; and the letter was not disclosed to others”). 
 261.   See, e.g., MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 508, 518 (D. Del. 2012); 
HSH Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 72–73, 72 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“[W]hile Nordbank and the non-party lenders wisely chose to reduce their common agreement to 
writing, their decision to do so does not mean that there was no prior agreement.  To the contrary, 
Nordbank has made a persuasive showing that the parties shared a common interest . . . .”); Tenneco 
Packaging Specialty & Consumer Prods. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 98 C 2679, 1999 WL 
754748, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1999). 
 262.   E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that parties had no joint defense/common interest before the date of execution on a common interest 
agreement). 
 263.   LaBrie, supra note 119. 
 264.   U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bunge N. Am., Inc., No. 05-2192 JWL-DJW, 2006 WL 3715927, at 
*1–3 (D. Kan. Dec. 12, 2006) (declining to apply common interest or joint defense privilege where 
parties failed to establish an underlying attorney-client privilege and failed to establish the elements 
of the common interest doctrine, even though the parties had entered into a written common interest 
agreement). 
 265.   Id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The common interest doctrine is an important aspect of attorney-client 
privilege law and Kansas should recognize it as such.  Kansas’s failure to 
recognize the common interest doctrine is problematic for attorneys, their 
clients, and the judicial system.  It is contrary to the national trend and 
creates uncertainty surrounding attorney-client privilege.  As such, Kansas 
attorneys and their clients cannot predict how the law will apply, and thus 
cannot conduct themselves accordingly.  As a late adopter, Kansas has a 
unique opportunity to evaluate other jurisdictions’ common interest doctrine 
application, and choose a form of the doctrine that best fits Kansas’s goals. 
The ideal solution is for Kansas to recognize the common interest 
doctrine either through common law, or by incorporating it into its attorney-
client privilege statute, K.S.A. § 60-426.  Regardless of the means, Kansas’s 
common interest doctrine should be clearly defined and fairly broad, 
consisting of the following elements: (1) a communication that is otherwise 
protected by attorney-client privilege; (2) made between two parties sharing 
a common legal interest; (3) in furtherance of the common interest; and (4) 
the parties did not otherwise waive the privilege.  This form would allow 
parties to more certainly predict whether information will be disclosed, 
furthers the rationale behind attorney-client privilege, and allows Kansas 
courts to ensure that the doctrine is not abused.  While this Comment 
proposes elements of an ideal common interest doctrine, recognizing any 
form would be an improvement from prolonged uncertainty that Kansas 
currently faces. 
 
